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1I INTRODUCTION WHOSE ARC, WHOSf CRISIS9
The assumption of this conLerence is LhaL Lhcrc is an >rc ol crLsLs 
stretching from the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent to the Horn of Africa 
While it is true that many states within this region face crises of great 
importance the widespread use of this phrase m  recent years is due more 
to our changing perceptions of the area than events that have occurred 
within it In brief the concept is Western in origin and not all regional 
states would agree that they form part of such an arc
This is especially true of India the largest and (next to the Soviet 
Union) militarily most powerful state in the area India has a different 
angle of vision a different set of strategic priorities and a different 
set of interests than we do The official Indian position has been that 
conflict m  the Indian Ocean region (they rarely if ever use Lhe phrase 
arc of crisis ) is due primarily to the intervention of outside powers 
If such powers would merely leave the region alone it would again return 
to normal This position is transparently self-serving (if outside powers 
depart the area this leaves India as the single largest and most powerful 
regional state) and deceptive (for as we shall discuss below India's 
interests in the region are complex and varied) However even if the NATO 
states and Japan do not come to share the Indian view m  whole or in part 
they must understand it for India alone among regional states has the military 
capacity and stable political leadership to play a major regional role 
be it positive or negative This is most clearly evident m  Lhc tase 
of Pakistan the focus of our concerns this week but it must be remembered 
that historically it was the Indian Array which was used as the regional 
enforcer by the British over a hundred-year period Further this will 
shortly be a nuclear India not a mere regional state but a budding
, j 1world power
2II INDIA S WORLD VIEW LEVELS OF CONCERN
The quickest way to point out the differences between Wesllern and
Indian perceptions of the arc of crisis is to set forth the major Indian
2 Isecurity concerns These are arrayed over four levels stretjching from
Ithe purely domestic to the purely global 1
Domestic Disorder
A large number of highly localized factors trends and events impinge
beyond the range 
present a
on India's security policy usually indirectly But they are 
of influence of outside states so we need only list them and 
summary evaluation Such events as the breakdown of urban law and order 
rural violence the revolt of tribal groups and increased dacoit activity 
( m  central India) smuggling political corruption an upsurge of unrest 
among Scheduled Castes and perhaps even railway security are ^ all examples 
of turmoil within India Yet historically the Indian system fias been
I
able to cope with such disturbances with great success This jis partly 
because the internal security apparatus has been modified (by | the creation 
of massive paramilitary forces under state and central control), and partly 
because India is such a vast complex (indeed continental) political system 
that it is rare to find major disturbances occurring m  more than two or 
three regions at a time I
It could be said that in this respect India (and Pakistan) are like 
Japan in their importance to the West Merely being a reasonably stable 
state satisfies most Western interests in the region Indeedj we overlook 
the contribution that India makes to regional stability by tending to its
own affairs
3Domestic and Regional Factors
There are however several sets of issues which cut across national 
boundaries and are important to both domestic and foreign policy These
factors arise out of the complex ethnic overlap between India |and its
I
weaker neighbors and the interdependence of regional economies
In India's volatile Northeast in U P and Bihar in Kashmir and
I
Punjab and scattered through the rest of the nation are tribal ethnic 
and religious groups that have political or other links abroad Most ol 
these links are to neighboring states (Pakistan Bangladesh Sri Lanka 
Nepal and China) In almost every case there has been some lLtcmpt on the 
part of neighbors or others to influence one or another group j In the 
case of Indian Muslims and Pakistan (and perhaps other Muslim countries) 
there is an ideological dimension as well From an Indian perspective 
the ideas that flow freely through the passes of Kashmir and NEFA arc 
as dangerous as the guns The Muslim question is particularly vexing 
as it strikes at the very heart of India's constitutional identity as a 
secular democratic state Indian Muslims have more political freedom 
than their Pakistani brethren but they also appreciate the tie to a broader 
Islamic world and the idea that Pakistan m  some ways represents a safety 
valve for them should their position in India become intolerable
At best this only complicates India's relations with Pakistan and 
other Muslim countries Indian Muslims arc not physically loc lied m  a 
strategic p] ice (the exception being Kashmir but Kishmins are among the 
least militant of Indian Muslims and among the best controlled by military 
and paramilitary units)
4The obverse dimension of ethnic overlap is the concern felt within 
India for groups m  neighboring countries that have ties to India Par­
ticularly the ideological links between the Nepal Congress and politicians 
m  parts of U P and Bihar the large Hindu minority in Bangladesh and 
the limited family ties between Indian Muslims and their Mahajir relatives 
m  Pakistan are all potential security-related issues A major factor 
in Indo-Nepali relations in the 1960s was the support given Lo Nepali 
democrats by Indians and a Cictor in the decision to intervene in rasi 
Pakistan in 1971 was the treatment of Hindus by boLh the Pakistan Army 
and the so-called Bihans lhc Indian government w is if raid tint the exodus 
of refugees would destabilize West Bengal and there was some suspicion 
that Pakistan was trying to sink India by generating the refugee population 
Much the same concern had been raised in 1963-4 m  Lhit else massive 
communal noting (over the theft of the Prophet's hair from Hazratbal 
Mosque m  Srinagar) broke out m  Orissa Bihar and West Bengal and 
communal Hindu groups systematically tried Lo push Indi in Muslims over the 
border into East Pakistan
A final source of tension are disputes over regional resources 
The outstanding issue is likely to be the development of water resources 
shared by India Nepal China and Bangladesh On the one hand is Lhc 
powerful economic incentive to cooperate on the other there is disagreement 
over the mode of cooperation India insists on bilateral discussions 
with its smaller neighbors while the latter are afraid of being dominated 
on a one-to-one basis and press for regional arrangements Similar problems 
occur m  developing joint navigation schemes weather information sharing 
trade and marketing arrangements and terms of trade In almost every 
case India s smaller neighbors are afraid of both the power of the Indian
5economy and the dynamism of Indian culture In India it is a highly emo­
tive issue especially if there is the suspicion that external powers are 
encouraging or supporting a smaller neighbor of India
Regional and International Factors
At a third level of analysis are factors which lie at the boundary 
of regional and international concern ihese are by Car of greatest impor­
tance to outsiders worried about India s relationship to the arc of crisis 
although they do not necessarily hold that position within India itself 
Chief among these factors are the increase or decrease m  support to 
regional states by external powers especially the Soviet Union the impact 
on the region of a superpower presence the uncertain quality of Chinese 
and American interaction with both Pakistan and India and the likely course 
of nuclear proliferation Each of these has a profound effect on Indian 
calculations of the direction duration and intensity of future war
ihe Soviet-Indian Tie What are iLs Premises7
There is room for disagreement as to the basic motivation behind the 
Soviet support for India and therefore there must be some ambiguity over 
the future of the Soviet-Indian relationship Soviet specialists tend to 
argue for the importance of India m  Soviet policy towards China (and poinL 
out that the U S S R  only became a major factor m  South Asia after 
Pakistan developed a military relationship with China and after Chinese 
troops engaged in armed conflict with the Soviets) Others note the 
durability and consistency of the Indo-Soviet tie and India s importance 
as the largest most powerful non-aligned friend of the Soviet Union 
They also dismiss the significance of the ten Indian array divisions facing
6China in Tibet I support the former position and would further argue 
that the Indian military are not as dependent upon the Soviet Union ns has 
been generally assumed Let us firsL look at the military calculation
It has been suggested that India will find it very difficult to break 
away from its Soviet source of weapons In particular the comparison 
is drawn between India s dependence on Russin ind LhnL of igypl ind the 
difficulty Egypt has encountered in finding alternative sources
If Lhere is a proper analogy it is noL Lgypt but Pakistan m  196a 
Pakistan found itself cut-off entirely from American weapons spare parts 
and new purchases although spares were later provided much Pakistani 
equipment was already obsolete and almost entirely American in origin 
Further this applied to the Pakistan Air Torce
Pakistan improvised sought Chinese help and found other sources 
of spares It did not exactly thrive under its new circumstances but 
it was able to hold off India m  the Western sector m  1971 also it 
did not lose East Bengal for lack of equipment An Indian general when 
faced with a potential cutoff of Soviet equipment would not despair or 
draw the Egyptian comparison but would point out that India is much better 
equipped than was Pakistan to absorb a cutoff from a major arms supplier 
not only does it have access to European weapons and its own indigenous 
military production facilities its civilian industrial base is infinitely 
greater Lhan 1 ikistan s He mighl even (unsull lus 1 îkisluu counterparts 
where he would learn that the cutoff forced Pakistan to develop mdigenous 
systems which— while not as good as the American— were adequate and led 
to improvement in Pakistan's capacity to absorb and improvise If political 
calculations change (shaped in parL by a Soviet presence in the region) 
then weapons dependency may not be as important as has generally been 
assumed and such changes might be possible even within the next few years
7The Regional Role of China
The salient quality of Chinese policy towards India is its unpredicta­
bility Indian administrators and soldiers are deeply suspicious of 
China and do not rule out a resumption of open conflict between India and 
China They cite the 1979 attack on Vietnam as evidence that the Chinese 
have not abandoned the use of force in dealing with its southern neighbors 
the difficulty of predicting Chinese behavior the unsettled character of 
Chinese politics and China's nuclear capability all fuel Indian caution 
and fear For Indians China is not only a factor in superpower politics 
but a factor in its own' region and thus an additional link between regional 
politics and global strategic politics
If China's potential hostility is nearly a permanent factor in Indi in 
calculations then the American-China relationship is seen as largely nega-
supports Pakistan with weapons and propaganda and 
.na economically but in both cases it is India that 
must face the unintended consequences Of course many Indians argue that 
India is the target of a so-called U S -Chinese-Pakistani axis but one need 
not subscribe to this view to reach the conclusion that the actual effect 
is nearly as bad from an Indian perspective
tive Indeed China 
the U S supports Chi
Nuclear Weapons as a Regional/lnternational Factor'
The third major factor which overlaps regional and international 
security concerns is the impending nuclearization of South Asia One 
element of this nuclearization has been discussed widely the disturbance 
it will cause among the world's non-nuclear states Lewis Dunn and others 
have described a nuclear proliferation chain extending from South Asia to 
the Middle East— and by example to other parts of the world However
sI would point to another linkage between the regional system and the 
international system
One of the long-range goals of India is to be able to deal with Chini 
on their border conflict from a position of equality This may mean the 
ultimate development of a nuclear weapon In the meantime India has been 
content to rest upon the known and unknown guarantees provided by the two 
superpowers (now apparently just the U S S R )  1 rom a Chinese perspective 
such efforts are seen not as an independent Indian move buL as a eonsequenee 
of Soviet encirclement strategies India runs the risk (particularly 
if it is pushed prematurely into a nuclear program by Pakistin) of inad­
vertently joining the Soviet-Chínese nuclear imbalance and thus indirectly 
the larger global strategic nuclear arms rice Would China dedieaLe part 
of its force against India> Would Indians know LhaL iL was noj- when Lo do 
so merely involved the rewriting of a computer program? Would the Soviels 
fmd it worthwhile to assist an Indian nuclear program if Lhe likely targets 
were to be in China7
Merely to raise these questions— which will be the common talk in the 
bazaar in a few years— is to indicate how little we have thought about them 
for no immediate answers suggest themselves I would venture to argue 
that not only do many Indians think of themselves as a natural target for 
China but that this is so because they are a natural rival for China and 
thaL many m  the West are once again coming iround to this view The more 
wc know of Chini the less impressed wt ire with its Lcehnical and political 
capabilities As China once again veers towards a position somewhere 
between the Soviets and the Americans we again appreciate how little we 
have in common with them politically culturally or economically and how
9important are our ties with the only slightly smaller but relatively open 
states of Southern Asia
Exogenous International Events
Finally Indian security is deeply affected by certain events which
occur outside of its region and beyond its control Chief among these events
was the breakdown m  the unrestricted supply of oil from India s major
4suppliers before India reached anything approaching self-reliance 
Skillful Indian diplomacy has seen it through the oil price increase and 
the Irannn-Iraqi war (both suppliers) would Tndn be as helpless as the 
resL of the world in the face of a new crisis one which really shuL off 
the flow7 Perhaps not In the face of a cataclysmic event in the Culf 
and the realization that disaster lay ahead some Indian leaders would 
consider a more activist policy The Indian Army was the original surrogate 
for the British m  the Gulf such units as the Baluch Regiment being raised 
as early as the 1830s precisely for this purpose (although before oil 
became important) During both World Wars Indian Army units Indian intel­
ligence and Indian civilian officials were deployed in the region There 
is a long history of Indian involvement m  the region as an instrument of 
great power politics
If the crisis were severe enough I am certain that present inhibitions 
about joining in what would now be termed a neo-imperialist military opera­
tion would dissolve With assurances of an equal voice and equal share it 
is quite possible that Indian decision-makers would join such an operation 
However the military and the navy will lack— for many years— the logistic 
sealift and airlift capability to engage in| such an action (even on a limited
scale) without superpower support
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Much of the above argument has been made in the case oL Pakistan 
but the notion of Indian cooperation m  the Gulf has seemed far-fetched 
I would not dismiss it so quickly Indeed ( if it is realistic to con­
sider the Pakistanis as a stabilizing force m  the Gulf then it is realistic 
to assume that the Indians will not be far |behind in offering their services 
both out of concern over the sharing-out and a desìi e Lo preempt the 
Pakistanis
If one begins to take potential Indian (or Pakistani) involveinenL in 
the Gulf seriously then there are important internal military implications 
Much of the current Indian doctrine on short-war strategies mighL have to
be supplemented or replaced by the notion o*f an international constabulary
I
force India’s own involvement in the Cor go and the Middle East UN peace­
keeping forces provides one historical precedent— certainly more acceptable 
than earlier duty under the British o.dag
Beyond access to oil India is also dependent upon the broader inter­
national system for supplemental purchases of gram weapons spares ammu­
nition and technology However (and veryjmuch like India’s more purely 
domestic security and law and order problems) these are to some degree 
self-regulating relationships dependent upon various global markets and 
unlikely to be the source of a major change in India’s security position
III CONCLUSION
Our brief survey of Indian security interests shows that while Pakistan 
and the region to the West are important to India these areas are by no 
means the only important components of India's world view India has one 
foot in the region and one foot on the world stage and the West will have 
to accommodate its policies to this fact just as Indians must accommodate
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themselves to the fact that there are legitimate Western security interests 
m  the Persian Gulf the Indian Ocean and even Pakistan
However India has not been ignorant of recent traumatic developments 
although m  discussing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan its diplomats 
have at times shown insensitivity to the English language and the plight 
of two and a half million Afghan refugees The official Indian position 
on the Iran-Iraq war the crisis in Afghanistan and other catastrophes 
oscillates between silence and the cliche that if only outside powers 
would go away the region would settle its own affairs
Behind this paralysis of policy lies a real debate within the Indian 
security community Indians remain divided over their ultimate interests 
vis a vis Pakistin whether they can live m  peace with Pakistin or whether 
the latter will be so unstable or so provocative that another war (this 
time to the finish) will be necessary But the hard liners have not 
won the day and India’s cautious policy on the ground since the invasion 
of Afghanistan has given Pakistan considerable breathing room What compli­
cates thought on this problem is that India’s ultimate relationship with 
Pakistan is intimately tied to its present relationship with the three 
major military powers of the world the U S S R  the U S A  and China 
There has been considerable movement away from the Soviets and towards a 
fresh start with the U S A  and there would have been even more movement 
vis a vis the Chinese if the latter had begun Lo take rls southern Asian 
twin seriously in 1979 when progress on the border issue was possible
I do believe that detente with Pakistan is a real possibility m  the 
next few years and that many individuals m  both states have come to see 
that their common interests are increasingly important Yet there are 
real obstacles to movement m  this direction The first is the knife-
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balance of power in Pakistan itself the role of the military has become 
a permanent feature of Pakistani politics but without either doctrinal 
base popular support or— indeed— widespread support m  the officer corps 
itself  ^ Further this military dominance of Pakistan concerns Indians 
who have always been nervous about the contamination of their own military 
Indian elites are suspicious of the U S role as Pakistan s chief weapons 
supplier (although this may not in fact be the case) The linkage between 
the Pentagon and Lhe generals of Rawalpindi is an old theme in Lndu and 
it is one of Zia's great accomplishments to have begun to persuade India 
that he jls different than his predecessors Tmally there are those m  Indi i 
(and indeed Pakistan) who support the Soviet position that unity between 
these two states is fraught with danger lhe lasL thing the Russians w mt 
is a de facto security arrangement bcLwccn these Lwo niiliLiiily cllceLivu 
states having them turn their weapons outward rather Lhan upon c ich other
The Soviets would like to see the present mini cold war between 
India and Pakistan go on indefinitely Each is then dependent upon the SovicL 
Union to some extent if only because the other is the Soviets could 
ultimately emerge as the de facto balancer of the South Asian system a 
feat that they attempted in 1965-8
Embedded in the above analysis are four alternative security futures 
for South Asia These are 1) the continuation of the present status quo 
and hostility between India and Pakistan jusL short of war 2) Indian emer­
gence as the regional dominant leader after the destruction of Pakistan’s 
military capability 3) increased Soviet influence to the point where they 
manage the Subcontinent and 4) a contained India as regional leader 
The last would involve real detente between India and Pakistan the nego­
tiation of a series of security and arms control agreements joint determina-
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tion of relative force levels and disposition of major units and (in the 
context of overall Indian dominance) an agreement that Pakistan could at 
least maintain a minimum deterrent (hopefully a conventional rather than a 
nuclear one)
I have elsewhere argued that the last future is not an impossible 
goal and that the presence oi the Russians in Afghanistan and ihc Americans 
in Diego Garcia and elsewhere may be a stimulus Lo regional states to move 
in this direction 6 What can outsiders do Lo encourage these two staLes 
to move in this direction or at least to see that the present balanced 
imbalance between India and Pakistan does not come crashing down7
First it is essential to recognize that Pakistan's security will 
always rest on Indian good will (or at least Indian calculations of g a m  ind 
loss) Helping Pakistan meet the crisis to the west without equally vigorous 
movement to the east is self-destructive and if various Western powers 
have not recognized this at least it has become a major theme of President 
Zia ul Haq's campaign to restore normal relations with India Further 
it must be recognized that a weak Pakistan is no less a threat to India 
than a strong Pakistan and many Indians are coming to acknowledge this 
point They do not want to see Soviet soldiers pouring m  to the Northwest 
Frontier Province (no doubt at someone's invitation) and have the Indian 
Army face them across the Indus There is an upper level and a lower level 
of Pakistani military power above which Pakistan becomes in unnecessary 
threat to Indi i and below which it becomes i temptition to Indi i the 
determination of these levels is one of the most critical regional security 
issues
Secondly outsiders must be clear about their priorities when it comes 
to nuclear proliferation Will we tolerate a nucleanzed Pakistan7 Will
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we tolerate an Indian attack (a la Israel) on Pakistani nuclear facilities' 
Will wc use Coree ourselves7 What steps would we ultimately be willing to 
tolerate to stop an Indian nuclear program' What is interesting is that 
most governments have tried to postpone making these choices or even thinking 
very deeply about the problem
Thirdly there are areas where the major outside economic powers can 
make a useful contribution to regional stability There are i number of 
joint river and water projects that could be pursued by India and one or 
more of its neighbors there is room for expansion of informational ind 
educational programs (especially on the issue of nuclear war) and there are 
even joint regional nuclear programs that could be pursued which would 
benefit from outside support and encouragement In brief if the Western 
powers and Japan are serious about enhancing the rewards for cooperative 
behavior in South Asia between India and Pakistan and are not to be 
entirely hypocritical about their nuclear policies they should be offering 
to sponsor such programs
nnally some day there will have to be movement on those territorial 
issues which are also disputes over national identity and purpose Kashmir 
is the most obvious problem but the Indian border conflict with China 
goes to the heart of India’s perception of itself as an important power 
and is also intimately related to the Soviet border dispute with China 
there may be lilLlc LhaL outsiders can do here by way oL direct intervention 
buL movement on Lhcsc issues (or at least agreement to dcLcr them while 
moving on to more amenable ones) is a necessary part of a broad strategy
of reconciliation
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